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Universityof Chicago and National Bureau of Economic Research
Widespread dissatisfaction with the current state of criminal justice
in the United States has revived interest in the long-standing problem of
determining what to do with a person charged with a crime between the
time of his arrest and trial.' Should the accused be released or detained
during this time interval? What factors are relevant to this decision?
What requirements, if any, should be imposed on the accused as a con-
dition of his release? The fundamental issue these questions raise is the
difficulty of reconciling the defendant's rights to freedom before his guilt
has been formally adjudicated with the community's interest in protect-
ing itself from possible future harm.2 In practice, most societies try to
This study has been supported by a grant for the study of law and economics from the
National Science Foundation to the National Bureau of Economic Research. I would like to
thank Gary Becker, Barry Chiswick, John Hause, Benjamin Klein, and Elisabeth Landes for
their criticisms and helpful comments, Elisabeth Parshley for her assistance, and H. Irving
Forman for charting the graphs. I also benefited from comments at economic seminars at
Columbia University, the University of Chicago, and the University of Massachusetts.
1. See, e.g., John N. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial
Detention, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1223 (1969); Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Pre.
ventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56 Va. L. Rev. 371 (1970).
2. The definition of harm is itself an important source of controversy. See, e.g.,John
N. Mitchell, supra note 1; Laurence H. Tribe, supra note 1. One definition includes only136 THE BAIL SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
resolve this conflict by means of a bail system that establishes rules and
procedures to guide decisions on whether or not to release a defendant.
These rules may specify which classes of defendants are eligible for
release, and require an eligible defendant to make a monetary payment
to the court, pledge an asset that will be forfeited if he does not appear
for trial, or have a third party assume responsibility for his presence at
trial.
In the U.S., the typical procedure is for the court to set a bond as
security for the defendant's appearance at trial. If he can post the amount
of the bond by pledging acceptable assets or by having a professional
bondsman do it for him, he is released; otherwise he is imprisoned. Data
presented in Table I reveal that a substantial fraction of defendants are in
fact imprisoned. A survey of more than 4,000 felony defendants across 70
counties in 1962 showed that 53 per cent of these defendants were con-
fined. A sample of defendants arraigned in New York City in 1971 indi-
cates that 68 per cent of those charged with felonies and 5 1 per cent of z
thosecharged with misdemeanors were imprisoned for average periods
of 38 days and 14 days respectively. Moreover, among felony defendants
boththe likelihood of detention and the average days detained rose the ILl z
moreserious the offense. Table 2 views pretrial detention from a different
perspective. It shows that of the more than 127,000 adult inmates in local
jails in March 1970 (excluding 25,356 adults yet arraigned or being —
heldfor other authorities), 41 per cent were pretrial detainees. The
President's Commission reports that nearly 40 per cent of adults in prison
are in local jails.3 Thus, about one in 6 adults in prison are persons whose
guilt has not been formally determined.
The fact that large numbers of defendants are denied pretrial liberty
—whether this is desirable or not—has important implications for the
overall operation of the criminal justice system. In the first place, the Z
greater the proportion of defendants not released, the lower the number
of trials relative to guilty pleas. The disposition of cases is affected in this
way because the costs of going to trial (specifically, the costs of waiting
due to court delay) are greater for detained defendants than those re-
theexpected losses (e.g., a weakening in the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions) that
result when some defendants flee, tamper with evidence, or intimidate witnesses during
the period of pretrial release. This leads to (he view that the only justification for deny-
ing or placing restraints on pretrial liberty is that the defendant's release would seriously
impair the proceedings against him. A broader definition of harm also includes predictions
about the losses from crimes committed by released defendants. According to this view the
potential dangerousness of the defendant is a legitimate reason for denying pretrial liberty.
3. See U.S. President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement & Admin. of Justice, The Chal-
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TABLE 2
DEFENDANTS NOT RELEASED ON BAIL IN LOCAL JAILS, MARCH 19708
Annual Operating and Capital




Bail and % Not
Not Released
Per Inmate
Inmates b Awaiting Trial Released ($000) ($)
127,707 52,565 41.2 161,950 3,081
lO6,08Id 2,017d
SouRcE.—U.S. Dep'tof Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Admin.,
1970 National Jail Census 9-11 (Nat'l Crim. Justice Inf. & Stat. Serv. 1971).
aLocaljails are those operated locally in municipalities which in 1960 had a
population of 1,000 or more. Facilities which normally detain persons for 2 days
or less were excludecL
bExcludes25,356 adults who were not yet arraigned or who were being held
for other authorities, and 7,800 juveniles.
Total was 203,967,000 but this was multiplied by .794 to take account of
inmates who were excluded. Operating costs were for 1969 while capital costs
were those planned for 1970.
Operating costs alone.
leased. Secondly, defendants not released are likely to have higher con-
viction probabilities in a trial and receive longer sentences if they plead
guilty than defendants released on bail. This occurs because detention
adversely affects the productivity of the defendant's resources (both
market and timeinputs). For example, in the case of market inputs de-
tention would hamper consultation with lawyers, and in the case of time
inputs detention would make it more difficult to seek out witnesses and
engage in other investigatory activities. Finally, if making bail is a positive
function of wealth, then the effects of pretrial imprisonment would fall
most heavily on low-income defendants.4 Recent empirical research on
the criminal court system provides some support for these hypotheses.5
4. See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, this volume, for a
further development of these arguments.
5. See William M. Landes, supranote4, for an empirical analysis across state county
courts using multiple regression techniques. A study by the New York City Legal Aid
Society (Brief for Appellee, Bellamy v. Abruczo (N.Y. Sup. CL, March 1972)) of de-
fendants in New York City also finds a positive relationship between pretrial detention
and the likelihood of a prison sentence, holding constant the defendant's prior record,
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The purpose of this essay is to reexamine the important questions of
pretrial liberty and bail determination from a different viewpoint than
the usual one. Instead of focusing on the desirability of actual bail prac-
tices or proposed reforms and their constitutionality, we begin by de-
veloping an economic model of an optimal bail system. Our approach is to
derive the social benefit from pretrial liberty that incorporates both the
gains to defendants from being released on bail and the costs and gains to
the rest of the community from their release. We then determine the num-
ber of defendants to release and the level of resource expenditures on the
bail system that are consistent with the maximization of the social bene-
fit.6 After developing the basic model we consider the consistency of the
rules derived from an optimal system with some existing practices in the
United States: for example, the practice of setting higher bail for more
serious offenses and for defendants with prior arrests (see Table 1 for
evidence on this), and the rationale of legislation that guarantees a right
to bail except for certain classes of defendants (e.g.,thoseaccused of
capital offenses). Two common views on the proper function of a bail sys-
tern—deterring flight and preventing future crime—are incorporated into
the model as special cases and compared to the more general criterion of
maximizing the social benefit.
The main contribution of this essay, however, is the development of
alternative methods to select defendants for release. Two basic methods
and variations on them are analyzed. Both are consistent with the crite-
rion of maximizing the social benefit function. The first, which cor-
responds to most existing bail systems, requires defendants to pay for
their release. The second compensates defendants for their detention via
a monetary or other form of payment. The latter proposal is not only
novel but, as we show, is superior in anumberof ways to existing bail
systems.7 The final part of the paper brings into the analysis the advantage
of crediting a defendant's pretrial detention against his eventual sentence,
family ties, employment status, and seriousness of the charge. For an early study that
supports some of these hypotheses see Anne Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 641 (1964).
6. This model is based on one presented by Gary S. Becker in Qime and Punishment:
An Economic Approach, included in this volume. Becker determines the optimal supply of
criminal offenses by selecting values for the probability of conviction and the penalty that
minimize the community's loss from crime. He does not explicitly consider the bail system,
although his approach is applicable to devising rules for an optimal bail system.
7. Gordon Tutlock discusses the possibility of compensating defendants not released
on bail in The Logic of Law 194—95 (1971). and I have briefly analyzed it. See William M.
Landes, pp. 178—79 this volume.140 THE BAIL SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
the possibility of tort suits by detained defendants who are acquitted, and
the role of bail bonds and bondsmen.
THE MODEL
GAINS FROM RELEASE
Let us assume that ndefendantshave been arrested and accused of com-
mitting similar types of crimes. From this group some will be detained in
jail while others will be released during the period between arrest and trial.
Let us also assume that each of the ndefendantsis expected to do the
same amount of harm prior to trial if released on bail.8 There are two
sources of gains to the community from releasing defendants: the gains to
the defendants (whom we assume are members of the community) and
the gains to the rest of the community. The gain to the defendant from
being released on bail (which is rigorously specified in a later section)
depends in part on his earnings outside prison, his wealth, the value he
places on the nonpecuniary aspects of pretrial liberty net of the con-
sumption provided him in prison, and any changes in the expected future
value of these variables resulting from pretrial liberty (e.g.,higherex-
pected future earnings if pretrial release lowers the probability of convic-
tion).9 The aggregate gain to all defendants released is the sum of the in-
dividual gains and can be written as
GG(b, t, p, u) (1)
where b is the number released on bail (bn),'°tis the time from arrest
to disposition of a case (or, equivalently, the length of pretrial detention),
8. The assumption of equal harm is not unreasonable in view of the earlier assumption
that defendants are accused of similar crimes, which is one indicator of potential harm. We
make the assumption of equal harm in order to simplify the presentation of the model.
Differences in harm can be handled by dividing nintosubgroups of defendants (i.e.,
n1, n2 n,,) where each subgroupconsists of persons who are each expected to do the
same amount of harm if released on bail. We would then derive the number of defendants to
release in each subgroup instead of simply the total number released. Theimplicationsof
differences inharmare discussed later.
9. Allgains and costs in thepaperare measured in terms of monetary equivalents.
10. Aggregating theindividualgains into the G function depends on which of the n
defendantsare released. Thatis,if b,t, pandu weregiven and defendants differed in their
gains from release, G would still be unknown unless one specified which defendants were
released. Therefore, we make the followIng assumption: if only one person is released, it is
the defendant witn thehighestgain; if two are released, it is the first defendant plus the
defendantwiththe second highest gain, etc. The justification for this ordering will become
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p is the probability of reapprehension for a defendant not appearing at
trial, and uisthe influence of other factors affecting the gains from release.
(Hereafter, residual terms such as uaredeleted.) One would expect G to
increase as more defendants are released, as the period of release
lengthens, and as the probability of recapture falls. That is, Gb > 0, G1 >
0, and G0 < 0 where 9G/ab =(etc.). (The latter notation is used for
all derivatives in the paper.)
The second gain from releasing defendants on bail, accruing primarily
to members of the community who are not defendants, is the reduction in
direct costs of providing detention services, which includes savings on
expenditures for jails, guards, food, etc. These savings would increase
with b and t as in
J=J(b, 1) (2)
where 0 and f > 0. The savings from releasing defendants are not
insignificant. The President's Commission estimates that the costs per
defendant of pretrial detention are between $3 and $9 per day.1' The data
presented in Table 2 indicate that the annual operating and capital costs of
pretrial detention facilities are more than $161 million, which comes to a
cost per defendant of about $3,000 annually and $8.50 per day.
COSTS OF RELEASE
It is not costless to release de'fendants on bail. As previously indicated,
harm or damage may result to the community that would not have oc-
curred had these defendants been in custody. The harm will include losses
from crimes committed by defendants during the period of pretrial liberty
and from a possible reduction in the effectiveness of the legal system as
some defendants disappear, tamper with evidence, or intimidate wit-
nesses.12 Thus the expected harm from all defendants released on bail
can be wrItten:
clearer when methods for releasing defendants are considered. The ordering of binthe
functions that are specified later is identical to the ordering in the G function; however,
since defendants can be assumed identical with respect to the other functions, the values of
these functions are independent of the ordering of b.
11.See U.S. President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement & Admin. of Justice, The
Courts 38 (Task Force Report, 1967).
12. As noted earlier (see supranote2), considerable controversy exists over the
desirability of including predictions about future crime in decisions on pretrial liberty. Al-
though we include it, the model would essentially be unchanged by its exclusion. This point
is developed later on.142 TI-LE BAIL SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
H =H(b,t, p). (3)
H will tend to be greater, the greater the number of defendants released on
bail, the longer the period of release and the less likely that defendants are
reapprehended. That is, 0,H,> 0, and<
A second source of costs (which for convenience are grouped to-
gether) consists of expenditures by the state to reapprehend defendants
and to affect the length of pretrial release. These costs may be written as
C =C(b,p,t). (4)
Since an increase in the probability of reapprehension (p) and a decrease
in the period of pretrial release (t) require greater resources,
C,< 0. Cbisassumed positive for two reasons. First, an increase in b is
likely to increase the number of released defendants who flee. With p
constant, this implies a proportionate increase in reapprehensions and
hence greater costs. Second, defendants released on bail are more likely
to go to trial (and less likely to plead guilty) than defendants not released,
SO that an increase in b will increase trial demand.14 This in turn will
increase court delay and raise t for a given supply of trials. Thus an
increase in b with t constant requires greater expenditures on the court
system and hence an increase in C.'5 Note that C is set at 0 when b =0
13. Since we assume the expected harm from each released defendant is the same,
H can be written as bI,(r,p)where ii(z,p)is the expected harm per defendant.
14. See William M. Landes. pp. 176—82 this volume.
15. This point is not as obvious as it may first appear. If one believes that the "quality"
of justice resulting from plea bargaining and guilty pleas is about as good as the "quality"
from trials, then any additional demand and subsequent expenditures for trial services that
result from increasing the number of defendants released is a cost to the community. It is a
cost in the following sense: the "quality" ofjustice is not being enhanced by releasing more
defendants but a more expensive method of disposing of cases (i.e.,moretrials) is being
used. Alternatively, if one believed that "quality" is raised by more trials and fewer pleas,
then part or all of these additional expenditures on trials should be excluded from the above
cost function. These two views come close to those described in "The Crime Control
Model" and "The Due Process Model" in Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal
Sanction 210—21 (1968). For example, "The Crime Control Model" rests on the belief that
most persons charged with a crime are "factually guilty" and hence a major cost of making
pretrial liberty the norm is that "the increase in time required to litigate cases that don't
really need to be litigated would put an intolerable strain on what is already an overburdened
process." In contrast, "The Due Process Model" starts from the assumption that the ac-
cused "is not a criminal." Pretrial detention and guilty pleas are often undesirable because
they lead one "to waive the various safeguards against unjust conviction that the system pro-
When large numbers of defendants are detained and plead guilty, "the adversary sys-
tem as a whole suffers, because its vitality depends on effective challenge."
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because there are no expenditures on p, and only the increment in ex-
penditures on the criminal court system that result from a positive b are
included in C.
NET BENEFIT FUNCTION
The net benefit from releasing defendants on bail depends on the gain and
cost components specified above, which in turn are functions of b, p,
and t. In principle, a number of additional considerations could enter the
net benefit function.'6 But in the analysis that follows we restrict ourselves
to a simple formulation of the net benefit function, which is the sum of the
cost and gain components. This measures the monetary equivalent of the
net gain from releasing defendants and is denoted by
G(b, t, p) ± J(b, t) —I-I(b,t, p) —C(b,t, p). (5)
Optimality requires that we simultaneously select values for b, t, andp
that maximize the value of ir. By assumption, defendants are selected for
release in a way that yields the highest G arid therefore the highest 77.Two
methods for selecting defendants that satisfy the above assumption are
considered. In the first, the defendant pays for his release; in the second,
the defendant is paid for remaining in jail prior to trial.
I
THE DEFENDANT PAYS
The n defendants will have a demand function for release on bail that can
be written as
bb(rn, I, p), (6)
where in is the price defendants must pay for pretrial release, and b, t,
and p are defined as before. Since defendants generally differ in the maxi-
mum amount they would pay for release, depending on differences in the
opportunity cost of their time, wealth, and tastes for nonprison compared
to prison life, a decline in ni(holdingt and p constant) would lead more
16. For example, if one believed that the harm defendants were expected to do was too
vague and difficult to predict, H might be given a small weight in the calculation of net
benefits. If part of G included the gains to persons from further crimes and this was deemed
an inappropriate source of utility, C could be discounted in estimating the net benefit
function. Alternatively, if it was strongly felt that defendants later found innocent should not
be detained, a greater weight could be given to G. (In the extreme, G would be so large that
all defendants were released.)(Hb) plus marginal
(Cb)minusthe
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Number released on bail
FIGURE 1
defendantsto choose release on bail in preference to jail.'7 Similarly, an
increase in t and a decrease in p would raise the relative attractiveness of
pretrial release, and increase its demand. Therefore, we would expect that
b,,,< 0,<0, andb1> 0.
Nowconsider the optimality conditions for maximizing the net
benefitThe variables subject to direct control by the state are C, the
costs of recapturing defendants and reducing the period of pretrial release,
and in, the level of money bail or the price of release. These variables
determine b, p,andt which then determine ir. Maximizing ir first with
respect to niyields
Gb=Hb+ Cb—Jb.
In words, money bail should be set at a level where the marginal gain from
pretrial release of an additional defendant (Gb) equals the marginal harm
17. Evidence from samples of defendants in the U.S. supports the view that money
bail is both negatively related to and an important determinant of the number of defendants
released. See, e.g.,Note,A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106
U. Pa. L. Rev. 693 (1958); Charles E. Ares,Anne Rankin & Herbert Sturz, The Manhattan
Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 67
(1967);Note,Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia,
102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1954); U.S. Atty. Gen'l's Comm. on Poverty & Admin. of Crim.
Justice, Report, app. 1 (1963)., + —J,)




where (i) and (ii) have been simplified by the substitution of equation (7). We largely ignore
(i) and (ii) in the subsequent analysis since our main interest is the determination of b and
19.At this stage I am ignoring difficulties of financing ni.Thesedifficulties could lead a
person to remain in jail although his gain exceeded m so that the number of defendants re-
leased at a price of th would be less than optimal.
20. Second-order conditions require that C,,,. < H,,,. + Cbb— Jbb atb (where C,,,. =
a1G1ab2,etc.).Figure1assumes thatC,.,, < 0 and (H,,b+C,,, —J,.,,) > 0.It seems
plausible that C,,. < 0 because the ordering of b in the C function is such that additional
defendants released value their release by smaller and smaller amounts. (H,.,+ —J,,,)
would probably be positive beyond some level of b for two reasons. If the marginal costs of
detention rise with the number detained, J,., will be negative (and hence—f,,,, > 0) since the
cost saving will fall as more defendants are released. If there are diseconomies of scale in
(7) recapturingdefendants and reducing court delay, C,, would be a rising function of b and
hence C,, > 0. Note that H,,. =0because all defendants are assumed to do the same
amount of harm if released. Corner solutions are possible. For example, if C,. > H,, +
C,.—f,. for all values of b, then b= a, and ifG, < H,, + Cb—J,. for all b, then b =0.
All defendants are charged the same price for release. In view of our assumptions of
similar offenses and equal harm, the use of a single price appears to be consistent with the
way bail actually operates. For example, the President's commission reports that
bail rates are often preordained by stationhouse or judicial schedules: so and so many
dollars for such and such a crime. The effect of standard rates and their disparity from place
to place is to leave out of consideration not only the important question of a defendant's
financial means but also the equally important ones of his background, character, and ties
to the community." U.S. President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement & Admin. of Justice,
szipranote3, at 131.
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(Ho) plus marginal costs of reapprehension and expanding court services
(Cb)minusthe marginal savings in detention costs Since a defend-
ant would choose release if his gain exceeded m,andprefer jail if rn
exceededhis gain, the optimal number of defendants would be released
if ntwereset at th where
Thus, defendants are charged a price for release that compensates for the
marginal harm and costs minus the savings in detention costs.19 The
optimum is illustrated in Figure 1 at b and th.2°
Severalimplications of the optimality conditions are worth noting.
(I) Wealthier defendants would be willing to pay a higher price for
their release on bail because forgone earnings tend to rise with wealth,
18. Although C is the remaining variable subject to control, it is more convenient to
maximize irwithrespect to Iandp. This would determine the optimal level of C given the
value of b that satisfies equation (7). In addition to equation (7), the first-order optimality
conditions would then include
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and "days free" are likely to be, in part, a consumption good with a wealth
elasticity greater than zero. Other things being equal, this would lead to a
greater frequency of pretrial release for defendants with higher incomes,
independent of capital market difficulties in financing bail. Although
released defendants would be buying their freedom, they would never-
theless be compensating society for the marginal harm and costs of their
release via the payment of money bail.2'
(2) We have assumed that differences among defendants in expected
harm do not exist. Suppose these differences exist and are detectable. We
could then separate defendants into subgroups where persons in each
subgroup were expected to inflict the same harm if released on baiL Sub-
groups expected to do more marginal harm (i.e.,ahigherwith still
equal to zero for each subgroup) would generally have money bail set at a
higher level and a smaller proportion of defendants released.22 in terms
of Figure 1, the supply curve would be further to the left for subgroups
expected to do more harm, resulting in a higher m and lower b for a given
G function.
(3) Suppose there was an exogenous increase in congestion in the
court system which increased the delay between arrest and trial. This
21.It has been suggested that bail would be more equitable if it were set with regard
to the defendant's ability to pay (i.e., his wealth). In our model this would have the effect of
increasing the state's revenue without altering the number or composition of released de-
fendants. Higher prices to wealthier defendants would enable the state to extract some of the
defendants' surplus (i.e., consumers' surplus) in Figure 1.
22. The net benefit function can be redefined as follows:
= G(b,, b2 ,...,b,, 1, p) + J(b, 1) — H(b,b2 b,,, 1, p) — C(b, t, p),
where b = b, + b,... + b,, and where defendants continue to be identical with respect to
the J and C functions. Maximizing 7T with respect to the b's (1 = 1 n) and setting
optimal prices for release yields
th, = Gb, = H,,,—C,,+ ib.
If we assume that the demand curve for release is the same for the n groups and ,3(H,,,)I
a,,,= 0. then the greater the group's marginal harm, the lower the proportion released and
the higher the price of release. One might argue that a group's demand curve for release
would be positively correlated with its marginal harm (i.e., the more harm a defendant is
likely to do, the greater is his gain from release on average). Our prediction of a decline in
the proportion released as the marginal harm rises would still hold if the G,, function shifted
up by a smaller amount than the (H,, + C,, — J,,) function. However, it is by no means ob-
vious that the marginal harm and gain are positively correlated. Innocent defendants are
likely to do the least harm if released, and their gain from release may be even greater than
for guilty defendants. The former, if detained, incur losses not only in current but also future
income resulting from any stigma attached to being in jail. They also may incur sizable
search costs to obtain employment after being found innocent and released.
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OPTIMAL BAIL AND CURRENT PRACTICES
Having set forth the basic model, we now compare some actual bail prac-
tices with the prescriptions of an optimal system.23 Table 1 shows that the
size of the bail bond tends to increase with both the severity of the charge
and the number of prior arrests (though this does not hold for every
charge and prior arrest class). Not surprisingly, the proportion of de-
fendants released declines with both the severity of the charge and the
number of prior arrests. These results are consistent with an optimal
system under the assumption that the severity of the charge and prior
arrests are indicators of greater marginal harm (Rb)andmarginal costs
(C5). The severity of the charge may provide information on marginal
harm for two reasons: (1) present charges are one predictor of the
damages from possible offenses during the period of pretrial release
(holding constant the rate of recidivism); and (2) the more serious the
charge, the greater the possible punishment and hence the greater the
defendant's gain (the avoidance of punishment being one component)
from not appearing for trial. It follows from (2) that the marginal cost of
reapprehending defendants (Cb) and the seriousness of the charge are
positively correlated since defendants faced with more serious charges
have a lower probability of voluntarily appearing for trial. Similar rea-
soning can be used to relate the number of prior arrests to greater
marginal harm and marginal costs. Admittedly, the above arguments are
•tenuous in the absence of empirical data connecting present charges and
prior arrests with marginal harm and marginal costs. Nevertheless, they
provide some rationale for present practices in the framework of an opti-
mal system.
23. One difference should benotedat the outset. Money bail, in,inthe optimal system
is a cash payment not returned to the defendant. In actual practice, most defendants are
• required to post a bond for which they pay a cash fee to a bondsman. However, this dif-
ference is not important for the analysis because we can redefine ininthe optimal system
•as the cash fee paid the bondsman. Optimality would then require the state to maximize the
net benefit by setting a value for the bond that resulted in the defendant paying the bondsman
an amount equal to the payment detived in equation (8). Hence, the use of bonds has little
effect on the analysis at this stage and is left for a later section and the appendix.148 THE BA[L SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
For certain offenses, the marginal harm and marginal cost may be so
great that it is not feasible for the defendant to compensate the community
for his pretrial release. (in terms of Figure 1, the supply curve would be
everywhere above the demand curve.) Optimality would be consistent
with legislation that prohibited pretrial liberty or permitted the denial of
bail for these offenses. In the United States, state and local laws provide
defendants with a right to bail in noncapital offenses but permit the denial
of bail in capital offenses. Since capital offenses are the most serious,
existing laws would appear to conform to the rules of an optimal system.
The classic capital offense, murder, does not entirely fit the argument for
denying bail to defendants accused of more serious offenses. Since
"most persons who are charged with this offense murder family members
or paramours and therefore are the least likely of all offenders to be
recidivists,"the denial of bail could not be based on predictions about
committing more murders during the time of pretrial release. instead, it
would have to rest on the contention that persons faced with the prospect
of such severe penalties would be most likely to flee.25
One can interpret the joint effect of the Eighth Amendment, which
states that "excessive bail shall not be required," and legislation that
grants a right to bail (except for capital offenses), as requiring that money
bail be set according to the amount the defendant can afford without re-
gard to marginal harm and marginal costs. A less extreme position would
require setting art upper limit to money bail at a "reasonable" level. If
this level were less than the amount that maximized the net benefit func-
tion, some defendants would be released even though marginal damages
and costs exceeded the gains from their release. In response, one might
expect the development of measures that circumvented constitutional
and legislative restrictions on setting bail: for example, "preventive
detention" in noncapital offenses (in effect, the setting of an infinite bail
charge) or the imposition of travel restrictions, requirements of weekly
appearances, etc., on released defendants to reduce marginal harm and
cost.
ALTERNATIVE VIEWS OF OPTIMAL BAIL
There are two views of bail that dominate much of the current discussion
on the topic. The first asserts that the primary function of a bail system is
to ensure the defendant's appearance at trial. Money bail should be set, if
at all, to prevent flight or more generally to prevent the defendant from
24. See John N. Mitchell, supranote1, at 1236.
25.Thispoint is made forcefully by Laurence H. Tribe, supranote1.
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interfering with the proceedings against him. Wherever possible, alterna-
tives to money bail and detention should be encouraged. The second view
asserts that the prevention of crimes by defendants during the period of
pretrial liberty is a proper concern of the bail process. Accordingly, the
potential "dangerousness" of the defendant is a legitimate reason for
setting high bail or denying bail altogether. For convenience, the former
position is termed the "deterring flight" model and the latter is called the
"preventive detention" model.26 Both models are special cases of the
basic model developed earlier in the paper and, therefore, both can be
incorporated into net benefit functions as follows.
Deterring Flight: ir1= G1(b,t,p) —H1(b, t,p)C1(b,p) (5a)
Preventive Detention:IT2G2(b, t,p) —J1,(b, 1,p) —C0(b, 1,p).(5b)
Thereare several important differences between (5a) and (5b)at
equal values of b,r,and p. The marginal harm from increasing the number
of defendants released (H5), from lengthening the period of pretrial re-
lease (H1), and from lowering the probability of reapprehension (HP) are
greater in the "preventive detention" than the "deterring flight" model
since the former adds another dimension to harm —namelypredictions
about future crime. Hence, H,,, < 1125,H,,< Hi,, and H,,, > The
marginal cost of increasing the number released (C,,) is less in the "de-
terring flight" model because it does not regard the additional demand for
trials that results from releasing more persons as a cost of the bail system.
In contrast, a willingness to include the costs of added congestion and
greater demand for trials is more characteristic of the "preventive deten-
tion" model. Thus, C,,, < C25. It also follows that the direct costs of re-
ducing the period of pretrial detention or court delay (C,) would be ex-
cluded from the "deterring flight" model.27
We can now compare the optimal values of in,b,t, and p that are
26.These descriptions are simplifications of the two positions and their many varia-
tions. Two recent papers that provide more detailed descriptions are John N. Mitchell,
siipra note 1, and Laurence H. Tribe, ,cupra note I. Mitchell argues in favor of the "preven-
tive detention" model, while Tribe argues against it and in favor of the "deterring flight"
model. An excellent discussion is also contained in Herbert L. Packer, supra note 15, where
"preventive detention" is part of his "Crime Control Model" and "deterring flight" is part
of his "Due Process Model."
27. One should note that the savings irs detention costs (the Jfunction)have been
excluded from (Sa) and (Sb) since both models give little or no weight to these savings. We
also assume that G, and C2 are equal, although it may be argued that the "preventive de-
tention" model tends to overlook these gains. However, the differences already noted in the
text between (5a) and (Sb) are sufficient for comparing the main implications of the two
models.
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obtained from maximizing the net benefit functions in (5a)and(5b). The
"deterring flight" model results in a lower money bail and a greater pro-
portion of defendants released than the "preventive detention" model
since both the marginal harm and marginal costs (and hence the supply
curve in Figure 1) are lower in the former than in the latter. The optimal
period of pretrial detention is less in the "deterring flight" model as the
marginal cost of reducing this time interval is excluded from the model's
specification. This means that court delay or pretrial detention is kept at a
minimum (i.e.,where= in the "deterring flight" model. Any-
thing greater lowers the net benefit. Supporters of this model would there-
fore favor a greater allocation of resources to the judiciary to reduce
delay. On the other hand, advocates of the "preventive detention" model
would put less emphasis on expanding the court's resources because the
resulting marginal benefits (a lower H) would eventually be offset by the
costs of reducing delay. In the latter model, the greater harm that results
from longer periods of pretrial liberty is countered by releasing fewer per-
sons. Finally, the optimal probability of reapprehending defendants
would be set higher in the "preventive detention" than the "deterring
flight" model because one element of harm from a lower probability (i.e.,
future crime) is explicitly excluded from the latter model.
THE DEFENDANT Is PAID
Let us return to the original model, summarized by the net benefit func-
tion in equation (5), with one important change: the defendant is paid to
remain in prison instead of paying for his pretrial liberty. He is offered a
choice between jail, where he receives rn* as compensation, or release on
bail, where he receives nothing. To distinguish this system from the one in
which the defendant pays, we first consider the effect on the defendant's
choice between pretrial liberty and detention.
Figure 2 presents a set of indifference curves between the defendant's
wealth and "days free" on bail. We assume that both wealth and "days
free" are sources of utility, "days free" are fixed atand, provisionally,
a defendant forgoes no current or future income if he is jailed. A defendant
with an initial wealth of W0 would be willing to pay up to W0 —W1for his
pretrial release. This puts him at E1, which is on the same indifference
curve as his original position W0, and leaves his utility unchanged.
Therefore, W0 —W1is the monetary equivalent of the defendant's gain
from pretrial release when "days free" are the property right of the state.
Suppose the state is required to pay the defendant for detaining him. The
defendant would now be at E0 and not W0 since "days free" have become
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theproperty right of the individual. This shift in property rights puts the
defendant on a higher indifference curve and increases his utility level.
The minimum amount he will accept to forgo to days is W2 —W0which
leaves him on the same indifference curve as the point E0. Thus, W2 —
measuresthe gain from release when "days free" belong to the defendant.
If the slopes of the two indifference curves in Figure 2 are equal at each
value of 1, the indifference curve passing through E0 will be everywhere
equidistant from the curve passing through E1 and W0 —W1will equal
W2 —W0.In this instance, "days free" has a zero wealth elasticity so that
the amount one will accept to give up his pretrial liberty is identical to the
amount one will pay to retain it. The former sum will exceed the latter if
"days free" has a positive wealth elasticity (which requires that the abso-
lute value of the slope of the higher indifference curve be greater than the
slope of the lower one at each g).28Theanalysis remains essentially the
28. With a positive wealth elasticity a further complication arises due to the uncertainty
of conviction. To illustrate, suppose the defendant is paid for pretrial detention and there
are two states of the world, a Conviction state with a probability P and a nonconviction
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same when present or future earnings are lost as a result of pretrial deten-
tion. The above monetary gains from release are merely increased by the
discounted value of the forgone earnings (i.e.,thelatter sum is added to
both W2 —W0and W0 —W1).
The main point of the preceding discussion is that the monetary
equivalent of the defendant's gain from release, which is summarized by
the G function, and hence the net benefit function depend on the type of
bail system specified unless the wealth elasticity of "days free" is zero.
To facilitate a comparison among different bail systems, therefore, we
will make the simplifying assumption of a zero wealth elasticity and then
point out the implications of a positive elasticity. If the defendant were
paid to remain in custody, the net benefit function in equation (5) would
remain unchanged, and wouldbe substituted for minequation (6).
Maximizingwith respect to ,n*wouldyield equation (7). Since a de-
fendant chooses freedom or jail depending on whether in"isless than or
greater than his gain from pretrial release, the optimal number of defend-
ants released would occur when
== H5+ Cb —Jb =
Thus,defendants would be paid th* to stay in jail and this equals th, the
optimal payment in the system where defendants pay for their release. In
terms of Figure 1, all schedules would remain unchanged and, therefore,
the number and composition of defendants released would be identical in
both systems. If the wealth elasticity of days free were positive, the Gb
curve would be further to the right in Figure 1 and both th* and the num-
ber released would be greater than their respective optimal values when
defendants must pay for their release.
Although the optimality conditions are the same whether one pays
defendants who are detained or defendants pay for their release, there are
a number of distinctions to be drawn between the two bail systems.
1. The "presumption of innocence" is part of American legal tradi-
tion. Yet, when defendants must pay for their release, persons are jailed
without compensation who by definition are not guilty. In effect, "in-
nocent" persons are punished. The conflict between practice and the
state with a probability (1 —P). Theminimum amount the defendant will accept to forgo
his pretrial freedom will be greater in the nonconviction state since he has a higher wealth.
We can define the expected amount the defendant is willing to accept as the sum of the
amounts in the two states weighted by their respective probabilities. However, the expected
amount will differ from the amount he is willing to accept to forgo pretrial release if his tastes
for risk are nonneutral. We do not explicitly introduce the latter result into our model since
it does not affect the qualitative comparisons between the different bail systems.
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"presumption of innocence" principle has so outraged some persons that
they have advocated the virtual elimination of pretrial detention. Others,
opposed to this view, cite the potential harm to the community from the
release of dangerous persons. However, paying persons for the right to
detain them simultaneously satisfies both views. It eliminates the pun-
ishment aspect of a bail system since those detained are detained volun-
tarily and are fully compensated for their losses, and it detains persons
where the potential damages to the community exceed the gains from
release.
2. A major criticism of requiring defendants to pay for their release
is that it discriminates against low-income defendants.29 This argument
has some support even in the context of the simplified model presented
above. Capital market difficulties may make it impossible for certain low-
income defendants to finance their release, although their gain exceeds
the money payment required for release. A system of loans from the court
to finance release could be instituted, but this brings with it the problem of
enforcing repayment.3° In contrast, when defendants not released are
paid, the charge of discrimination against the poor is eliminated.
3. In a voluntary bail system the community would often pay higher
sums to detain defendants the greater the marginal harm and marginal
costs of reapprehension that result from their release. In some instances,
the payment would be extraordinarily large and possibly infinite. For
example, a psychotic defendant accused of multiple premeditated mur-
ders and certain to be convicted is likely to value his release highly since
it provides him with the opportunity both to escape conviction and to
commit additional murders. Although this is an extreme example, it
illustrates an obvious problem: a volunteer system provides greater re-
wards to persons the more dangerous they are or appear to be. The source
of the problem is the strict adherence to the principle that "persons are
presumed innocent until proven guilty" and, therefore, should not be pun-
ished until found guilty. The strict maintenance of a principle can be too
costly. If we are willing to compromise, the problem of larger pay-
ments to more dangerous defendants becomes tractable. Suppose a partic-
ular group of defendants are deemed sufficiently dangerous so that the
net benefit function is maximized when all are detained (i.e.,thesupply
êcurveis everywhere above the Gb curve in Figure 1), but the payment to
29. See, for example, U.S. President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement & Admin. of
Justice, .cupra note 11, at 37—39.
30. The institution of bondsmen for financing bail is relevant here. This is discussed
later.154 THE BAIL SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
achieve a zero release rate is unacceptably large. We might simply fix a
maximum payment and jail (voluntarily or involuntarily) the entire set of
defendants. It must be emphasized that this modification substantially
alters the nature of the bail system where defendants are paid. We no
longer allow certain defendants the choice between pretrial release or
jail. Instead, this decision is made by the court or prosecutor with the
stipulation that a jailed defendant receives some compensation.
4. A problem related to the above is that arrested offenders have an
incentive to exaggerate their potential harm and desire to escape if re-
leased on bail as a means of extracting a higher payment for remaining in
jail. Note, however, that this problem exists in reverse when defendants
must pay for their release. There, the prosecutor has an incentive to exag-
gerate the potential danger from releasing the defendant in order to per-
suade the magistrate to set a higher bail.3'
S. The physical facilities and living conditions that are provided
detained defendants are often deplorable.32 This is not surprising because
when defendants pay for their release there is little incentive for the state
or court to improve these conditions. In contrast, a volunteer or partial
volunteer system (i.e.,forsome offenses the defendant is given the choice
between release or jail) would provide such an incentive. Improved de-
tention facilities would reduce the nonmoney costs of detention to de-
fendants, which in turn would reduce the amount the state would have to
pay to detain them. The less unpleasant these facilities, the lower the pay-
ments. An optimum degree of unpleasantness would be achieved when
the marginal costs of improved facilities equaled the marginal savings in
payments to jailed defendants.
6. Reducing the time between arrest and disposition has been urged
as the best practical solution to problems of the existing bail system.33
31. The advantage of high bail to the prosecutor is that it raises the likelihood of con-
victing the defendant. See William M. Landes, pp. 176—77 this volume.
32. A major complaint of inmates who rioted in the N.Y.C. Tombs (a prison for
persons not released on bail) was the overcrowding, inadequate food and presence of
roaches, lice, etc. Their complaints were verified by public officials and prison guards. (See
Newsweek, August 24, 1970.) Also see U.S. President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement &
Admin. of Justice, supranote11, at 38. on the poor quality of pretrial detention facilities.
33. Chief Judge Harold Greene of the Court of General Sessions in Washington, D.C.,
has argued as follows:
A strict policy favoring the detention of criminal suspects is bound to lead to the
incarceration of some who will ultimately be acquitted. On the other hand, a liberal release
policy has caused and will continue to cause the pretrial freedom of many who will take
advantage of their freedom to continue their criminal careers to the detriment of society.
Opinions differ as to which is more harmful to our values. ... Whateverone's view on this
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Whatever one's view on this
Less pretrial delay would diminish the losses to detained defendants, the
harm that released defendants might do, and the direct costs of detention.
One could argue that delay would be reduced more when defendants are
paid compared to when they pay because the former provides an ad-
ditional incentive for the state to reduce delay —namelya reduction in the
size of payments to attract a given number of volunteers.34
7. The two systems will have different effects on the deterrence
of crime. When defendants are paid, the expected cOsts of committing
crimes are lower than when defendants must pay for their release. In the
former, the economic returns to the criminal are higher and, other things
remaining the same, the amount of crime will tend to be greater. However,
which bail system is preferable on deterrence grounds alone is not ob-
vious. For example, if penalties and probabilities of conviction are
optimally set without explicitly considering the bail system, then requir-
ing defendants to pay for their release will impose added penalties that
result in overdeterrence. On the other hand, if penalties or probabilities
are inadequate, we may move closer to an optimal level of deterrence
when defendants pay for their release. Thus, without knowledge of the
existing penalties and probabilities, we cannot determine which bail sys-
tem produces a more desired level of deterrence. Moreover, if penalties
and probabilities are adjustable, one can adjust them to achieve the
optimal deterrence level for each type of bail system.
SOME MODIFICATIONS
Two further problems in the development of an optimal bail system are
now considered: the "moral hazard" problem, which occurs primarily
when defendants are compensated for pretrial detention, and the provi-
sion of incentives for defendants released on bail to return for trial. The
issue,no one could reasonably quarrel with the proposition that the most desirable solution
to this dilemma is to escape it altogether.
Escape is possible, but only through the construction of a judicial system which tries
its suspects so quickly that the incarceration of innocent defendants or the pretrial freedom
of potential repeat offenders is so brief as to be acceptable as a practical matter
(Washington Star, March 30, 1969, at F2, quoted in American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, The Bail Reform Act 47—48 (April 1969).)
34. Note that the optimal amount of delay, z, is the same in both bail systems (assum-
ing a zero wealth elasticity of days free) because payments made either by defendants or
the state are viewed as transfer payments that do not enter the net benefit function. The
inference in the text regarding "additional incentive" is clearly not derived from the opti-
mality conditions but from a view of how the state would actually behave when confronted
with a limited budget and having to pay defendants.156 THE BAIL SYSTEM: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH
recognition of each problem leads us to devise alternative payment
schemes to those previously set forth.
THE "MORAL HAZARD" AND CREDIT AGAINST SENTENCE
The "moral hazard" arising when defendants are paid is that a person
may commit and confess to a crime, or confess to a crime he did not com-
mit, for the sole purpose of collecting a payment for his detention prior
to conviction. This would be most likely to occur for crimes in which the
levels of pretrial payments were high relative to the eventual sentence,
and for persons with low opportunity costs. One can avoid this difficulty
by paying the defendant for pretrial detention only if he is found innocent,
and giving him credit toward his sentence for pretrial detention if he is
convicted.35 With this modification the incentive to confess as a means of
receiving pretrial payments would be eliminated since a confession would
largely preclude receiving payments.36
The payment and credit scheme can be formally incorporated into
our model as follows. Both the gains to defendants (the G function) and
the savings in jail costs (the J function) from pretrial release will be less
than when payments alone are used. The gains from release are less be-
cause one must deduct from each defendant's gain the amount he values
the credit for pretrial detention.37 The savings in jail costs are less when
credit is given since we eliminate savings (ignoring discounting) to the
community from the pretrial release of defendants who are subsequently
35. In most States pretrial detention is not by law deducted from the sentence re-
ceived by the convicted defendant. However, some judges make allowance for this when
fixing sentence by lowering the latter by the amount of time spent injail prior to conviction.
See Daniel J. Freed & Patricia M. Wald, Bail in the United States: 1964, at 89—90 (1964).
36. The "moral hazard" problem would not be entirely eliminated because a defendant
might initially confess or "plant" evidence making him appear guilty and at the time of trial
reveal evidence that resulted in his acquittal. Incentives for such frauds could be reduced by
making them subject to penalties. However, it appears unlikely that one could design a bail
system that was entirely free of "moral hazards." For example, we previously noted that
either the defendant or the prosecutor has an incentive to exaggerate the potential harm
from release depending upon which bail system is operative. Moreover, when the defendant
pays for his release, the prosecution may purposely impose large costs (including detention)
on a person known to be innocent by having a high bail set. Of course, even a system where
defendants are paid allows the state to detain innocent persons; however, it raises the cost
by shifting the burden of the payment from the accused to the state.
37. Let g, and g7 equal the wealth equivalents of the ith defendant's gain from release
when no credit is given and when credit is given, respectively. We want to show that
>As previously noted (see supranote28),is more correctly an expected gain
that equals the gain if convicted timesthe probability of conviction, plus the gain if
not convicted times (1 —Pt).The concept of an expected gain is also applicable toSince
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convicted; their release merely transfers jail costs from the present to-
ward the future. In terms of Figure 1, these factors lead to a downward
shift in the demand curve for release (as the gains to defendants fall) and
an upward shift in the cost curve (as the deduction for savings in jail
costs decline). This in turn results in the release of fewer defendants than
when no credit is given. Other things remaining the same, the shifts in
these curves will be greater, and hence the decline in defendants released
will be greater, the higher the probabilities of conviction, the greater the
value defendants attach to credits, and the lower the community's dis-
count rate on savings in future jail costs. In sum, optimal policy will be
to detain a greater proportion of defendants when credit is combined with
payments than when payments alone are used.
As in the earlier analysis, suppose that varying the size of the pay-
•ment to defendants is the means by which the state affects the number of
defendants released and detained. Here the payment is received only if
the defendant is not convicted, since credit is given if he is convicted.
At what level should the payment be set to maximize the net benefit
function? It can be shown that a uniform payment would not lead in
general to the release on bail of the optimal number of persons from our
sample of n defendants.38 Instead, the state would first determine
whether or not the defendant should be detained, and then offer to pay
each detained defendant an amount that would induce him to remain in
the gain from pretrial release if convicted is less when credit is given than when it is not by
the amount one values the credit (which is equivalent to a reduction in sentence), gç >ge"
whenPf >0.The value of the credit to the defendant will depend on the rate of discount of
future "days free," the length of his sentence, and the value of days free" in the future.




P5 andare the gains from release if
not convicted, andand arethe gains if convicted. To simplify, assume that the credit
fully compensates for pretrial detention if one is convicted so thatand cc5 are both zero.
Suppose<but> and optimality requires that A be detained and B be re-
leased (because A's expected gain is less than the net costs of his release while B's ex-
pected gain is greater). The minimum contingent payment that A will accept to remain in
jail will equal and the minimum that B will accept will equal If a single payment
were offered that was sufficient to induce A to remain in jail, then B would also be willing
to remain in prison (as g,,, >g5),contrary to the optimality condition. A uniform payment
would be consistent with optimality in the special case where the rank correlation between
expected gains and gains if not convicted were equal to I (e.g.,inthe case where the proba-
bilities of conviction were equal for all defendants or where defendants with higher g0's had
lower P's).
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prison. The decision to detain or release would depend on the state's
estimate of whether the expected gain to the particular defendant from
his release was less or greater than the potential harm from his release
plus the costs of reapprehending him and expanding trial services, minus
the expected savings in jail costs. Such a policy would be consistent with
the maximization of the net benefit function and would lead to the optimal
numker of defendants released. A more attractive payment scheme might
be to defer the setting of payments until the completion of the defendant's
case. At that time, if he were found innocent, he could bring a tort action
against the state to collect payment both for damages suffered during
the period of pretrial detention and for the costs of bringing the action.
The sole question before the court would be the amount of compensation
since the question of liability would have already been decided by the de-
fendant's acquittal. One who favored a "voluntary" bail system (even if
only for certain types of offenses) might initially object to a credit and tort
remedy on the ground that it enables the state to detain persons prior to
trial without their consent. However, if the tort action permitted the de-
fendant to receive full compensation, the latter would equal what he
would have accepted to remain voluntarily in prison prior to the disposi-
tion of his case.39
INCENTIVES FOR APPEARING AT TRIAL
In our model, the likelihood of appearing for trial is one of several factors
relevant in maximizing the net benefit function. The likelihood of appear-
ing determines in part the harm from releasing defendants and the costs
of reapprehending them (since the frequency of attempts to flee will
affect the cost of achieving a given probability of reapprehension); how-
ever, the net benefit function is also affected by considerations of possible
new crimes, the costs of expanding trial services, and the savings in jail
costs. Nevertheless, appearing for trial is an important factor and it is
worthwhile to consider more explicitly what mechanisms can be devised
to provide incentives for the defendant's appearance.
39.When defendantsarepaid to remain in prison prior toadjudicationof their cases 40. See Gary S. Becker, tl
but no credit is given, detained defendants will have funds to replace their forgone earn- 41. The analogy to insura
ings, enabling them to finance a defense. However, one could argue that with a tort remedy specializing in bail bonds is to I
these funds would not be available, which would result in higher probabilities of conviction due, for example, to usury law
for those detained compared to those not detained, other things remaining the same. How- 42. One survey of 19 cour
ever, this inference is not correct because defendants would be able to make contingent leased, 45% used professional
contracts with lawyers who would agree to defend them in exchange for receiving a payment posted cash and 8% were rele2
only if their client was acquitted. Similar contracts are common in many tort actions (e.g., the State Courts—A Field Stu
negligence cases). puted these figures by taking a
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The most direct method would be to make nonappearance a crime in
itself and set appropriate penalties to achieve the optimum deterrence of
this crime.40 One objection is that the deterrent effect of these penalties
is likely to be small because they represent only a marginal increment in
the penalty for a defendant likely to be convicted. However, this implies
that the appropriate degree of deterrence would require a relatively high
penalty for nonappearance and one that is probably in proportion to the
penalty for the crime the defendant is initially accused of committing.
Moreover, it follows from the optimality conditions of the bail model that
defendants accused of the most severe crimes (where penalties for non-
appearance may have the smallest deterrent effect) are the least likely to
be released on bail.
When defendants must pay for their release, another way to provide
an incentive for the defendant's appearance would be to set a money pay-
ment or bond that is returned only if the accused appears at trial. In such
a system firms are likely to arise that would be willing to accept the risk
of nonappearance, and hence forfeiture of the bail bond, in exchange for a
fee to compensate them for their expected losses. Thus, an institutional
arrangement would come about for shifting the risks of nonappearance
from defendants to bondsmen.41 In the United States, this is precisely the
system that has developed. Of those defendants free on bail, a large pro-
portion were released because a bondsman posted a bail bond.42 A formal
analysis of the bail bond system is presented in the appendix.
It has been alleged that the shifting of potential financial loss to the
bondsman removes the incentive for the defendant to appear at trial. This
need not be true, for the following reasons: (1) Bondsmen usually require
collateral from the defendant. This is a form of sharing or pooling the
risks with the accused and thus both suffer losses from nonappearance.
(2) The defendant is liable for the amount of the bond should it be for-
feited. (3) The bondsmen have an incentive to protect their investment
via the expenditure of resources to reduce the likelihood of the de-
fendant's fleeing. This would include periodic checkups of the defendant's
whereabouts and threats to revoke the bond (which would make the de-
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oreplace their forgoneearn-
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igs remainingthe same. How-
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40. See Gary S. Becker, this volume, for the derivation of optimal penalties for crimes.
41. The analogy to insurance is not perfect, since another important reason for firms
specializing in bail bonds is to provide funds for defendants who cannot borrow from banks
due, for example, to usury laws or poor collateral.
42. One survey of 19 counties in the U.S. in 1962 indicated that among defendants re-
leased, 45% used professional bondsmen, 35% had friends or relatives post a bond, 12%
posted cash and 8% were released on their own recognizance. See Lee Silverstein, Bail in
the State Courts—A Field Study and Report, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 621, 647 (1966). I com-
puted these figures by taking averages for the counties where data were given..1
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fendant a fugitive). In addition, the bondsman is given the power to arrest
a defendant who flees, and there are scattered reports of bondsmen re-
lentlessly pursuing, apprehending, and returning the defendant.43 (4) Pro-
fessional criminals who regularly appear in court have little incentive to
flee because bondsmen would be unwilling to post bail for them in the
future.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The main contribution of this essay has been to propose and analyze an
alternative to the existing bail system. This alternative is a system in
which the defendant is compensated for his pretrial detention in contrast
to the present method of having the defendant pay for his release. Com-
pensation to detained defendants can take a variety of forms that include
money payments, credit against sentence for persons subsequently found
guilty, and tort remedies for those acquitted.44 Our approach was first to
derive a net benefit function from releasing defendants prior to trial that
incorporated both the gains to defendants and the costs and gains to the
community from their release. The optimal number of defendants re-
leased was one that maximized the net benefit. Although the optimality
conditions were largely unaffected by whether the defendant had to pay
or was paid, there are some important advantages to a system in which
defendants are compensated. The major one is reducing the punitive as-
pect of the bail system, since those detained are compensated for losses
resulting from their detention. Other advantages include reducing dis-
crimination against low-income defendants and providing incentives for
the states to improve pretrial detention facilities.
Criticisms of the existing bail system and proposals for reform play
an important role in current policy debates over effective law enforce-
ment. Most proposals call for weakening or even eliminating the require-
ment that the defendant pay for his release. In its place, these proposals
typically advocate extensive investigation of the defendant's background
to determine suitability for pretrial release. If he is found suitable, the
defendant may be release
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43. See Daniel J. Freed & Patricia M. Wald, supranote35, at 30—31. The incentive to
return the defendant to custody, after he does not appear, is that the bondsman is usually
given a grace period of about 30 days before he forfeits the bond.
44. The question of whether compensation is a realistic alternative to the existing bail
system is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we should note that one difficulty in
implementing this proposal is that the majority of voters do not expect to be defendants;
therefore, itis unlikely that they would favor a proposal that reduced their wealth and
increased the wealth of future defendants.
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defendant may be released without having to post a bond or having only
to pay a nominal sum. "Suitability" would be determined on the basis of
the defendant's ties to the community, his employment record, past con-
victions, etc. In New York City some experiments have already been
conducted along these lines by the Vera Foundation. The major defect of
these proposals is the fate of the defendant not recommended for release.
He would be jailed without compensation and thus punished although by
law he isstill "innocent." In contrast, the proposal advanced in this
essay not only lessens the punitive aspect of the bail system by compen-
sating jailed defendants but also provides an incentive to set up investi-
gatory procedures that are advocated in the above proposals. The reason
is that paying defendants shifts part of the burden of the bail system
from the defendant to the state, and hence there is an incentive for the
state to reduce this burden by allocating resources to discovering which
defendants are likely to do little harm if released.
APPENDIX
THE BONDSMAN
In our model both bail bonds and firms specializing in the sale of these bonds
(i.e.,bondsmen)were omitted.Let us now introducethem into the analysis, and
assume the following: (I) a money payment, denoted by M, is set by the court for
the defendant's release, but instead of M being paid directly by the defendant, a
bondsman posts M with the court in behalf of the defendant;(2) M will be for-
feited only in the event the defendant does not show up for trial (i.e.,ifthe de-
fendant shows up, the bondsman makes no payment to the court); (3) the bonds-
man charges the defendant a fee for this service equal to f M where 0 <f < 1
and he may also require some collateral; and (4) competition initially prevails
among bondsmen.
Total costs (T) for the group of firms writing bonds will tend to increase with
increases in the number of defendants not showing up for trial, the size of M, and
the time from arrest to disposition.46 That is
T =T(p,b, M, t), (10)
45. This system would not prevent the defendant from depositing cash or another asset
valued at M to secure release. However, we rule this out in the analysis in order to focus
on the bondsman.
46. A longer t implies a greater average volume of bail bonds outstanding at any
moment in time. Since we would expect bondsmen to hold reserves (which have an oppor-
tunity cost) against the contingency that a defendant will not appear for trial, a longer t will
he associated with a greater volume of reserves and hence greater costs.f0M0
whereT9 <0,T5 >0,>0and T, >0.The demand function of defendants
for release on bail is similar to the previous demand function (see equation (6))
and may be written as
b =b(fM,t,p,ii), (11)
where fMisthe fee to the bondsman, and r, p and uaredefined as before except
that the residual ii would also include the amount of collateral required by the
bondsman. Both bf(= ob/afM(M)) and b,11 are assumed to be negative. If M
were set at M0 (and tandp are given), equilibrium in the market for bail bonds
would take place atj0M0 and b0 in Figure 3. At higher levels of M, for example, Tb
shifts to the left, fM rises and b falls. Thus, to maximize the net benefit function
ir (see equation (5)), M would be set by the court at a value where the number of
defendants released on bail in Figure 3 was equal to the number that maximized
IT47Thatis
JM= T5= Gb=Hb+Cs—Jb. (12)
Although the optimal M in (12) would be greater than the optimal money pay-
ment (th) in the model that excluded the bondsman, the number of defendants
released on bail and the actual payment for release would be the same.
Let us drop the assumption of a competitive market in the sale of bail bonds,
and instead assume a cartel agreement among bondsmen where entry is restricted
and the fee for bonds is set above the competitive price. Both fee-fixing and entry
restrictions are enforced by
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restrictions are enforced by the state.48 The cartel would take a curve marginal to
the demand curve in Figure 3 (assuming no price discrimination) and for a given
M this would result in a higherfM (i.e.,ahigherf) and fewer defendants released
than in the competitive case.49 However, the state could compensate for the
cartel by lowering M below the competitive level in order to release on bail the
optimal number of defendants.
48. Some form of state regulation appears to be the rule. For example, in large metro-
politan areas bonds are generally written by agents (bondsmen) of surety companies that
are regulated as part of the insurance business. Fees and minimum cash reserves are set
by the state. Bondsmen are also licensed in some states. In addition, there exist laws
prohibiting bondsmen from giving rebates to attorneys and public officials in exchange
for recommending clients, and from soliciting business in courtrooms. See Daniel J. Freed &
Patricia M. Wald, supranote38, at 36—38.
49. This would require
b JMG?119+Cb—Js (i)
(ii)
function of defendants where eisthe elasticity of the demand curve G5 in Figure 3. With the same number of
I function (see equation (6)) defendants released in the competitive and monopoly cases, the fees to defendants (fM)
arealso the same. However,f is larger and M smaller with monopoly than competition.
(11)
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